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RESISTING THE CORPORATIZATION OF
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: TRANSFORMING

OBEDIENCE INTO FIDELITY
Linda Sugin *

I. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONFERENCE
It is my privilege, as organizer of this conference, to reflect on the
excellent papers published in this issue and the wonderful discussions that
they inspired. The presentations left me with the impression that the law of
nonprofit governance is moving toward a more corporate model of
accountability-a model that emphasizes audits and other formal financial
controls,1 and that focuses enforcement on financial wrongdoing and
misuse of charitable funds by directors and managers. 2 Along with these
developments, it appears that the legal role of donors in nonprofit
governance is growing, increasing donors' ability to impose their vision on
the organizations that they support. 3 These trends are reflected in the
models for nonprofit governance prepared by the Panel on the Nonprofit
The panel's report,
Sector and the American Law Institute (ALI).
Strengthening Transparency, Governance and Accountability of Charitable

Organizations, closely followed a business model, stressing financial
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I would like to thank all the conference
participants. I am grateful to Mark Amot, Courtney Darts, Taylor Romigh, and especially
Sharon Connelly for research assistance.
1. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for GreaterAccountability of Nonprofit
Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposalsfor Change, 76 Fordham L. Rev.
609 (2007) (discussing proposed governance rules). In particular, see the recently adopted
California Nonprofit Integrity Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 12586 (West 2004).
2. Evelyn Brody observes that "the standard of care is precatory only." Evelyn Brody,
The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law and
Practice, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 521, 559 (2007). The 1996 adoption of the intermediate
sanctions regime for self-dealing in the Internal Revenue Code marked a major
federalization of the enforcement of the duty of loyalty. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). Excessive
compensation is a particular concern currently. See IRS, Report on Exempt Organizations
Project
(2007),
available
at
Executive
Compensation
Compliance
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec._comp._final.pdf; Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to
Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 735 (2007).
3. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 1, at 620-22 (enabling donors to enforce the terms of
their gifts); John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes
Around, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 693 (2007); see also Glenn v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. B151776,
2002 WL 31022068, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2002) (holding that donor's allegations
of misuse of funds donated to endow university chair were sufficient to plead causes of
action for common law and statutory misappropriation).
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accountability, 4 while devoting lesser attention to how organizations can be
impelled to carry out their missions. The ALI Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations explicitly adopted fiduciary obligations for
nonprofit directors that were based on the principles applicable to business
boards. 5
These developments offer opportunities to improve the
functioning and reliability of nonprofit governance. Financial controls,
such as audit committees or mandated audits, would improve the reliability
of the information available to donors and regulators. Eradicating stealing,
excessive compensation, and misdealing within organizations is undeniably
a worthy goal. In addition, increasing the range of remedies available to
donors, compared to those available under current law, 6 may bolster their
support of the charitable sector.
Nevertheless, these developments cause me to wonder what nonprofit
governance is for, and whether this legal course we are traveling leads to
the ultimate end that we seek: effectiveness in carrying out charitable
goals. We must analyze whether requiring--or even encouragingconformity to a business model produces meaningful results for charitable
endeavors. If the kinds of controls that the law institutes do not produce
effectiveness for nonprofit organizations, they may do significant damage
by steering the sector off course. Each of these business-type controls has
costs of its own-some of which the papers in this book consider. Audit
requirements and other financial procedures are expensive for
organizations, diverting both resources and attention from charitable
programs. Small organizations, in particular, might strain under such
requirements. Thus, different regimes are necessary for large, sophisticated
organizations and small, simple ones, similar to the system for business
corporations. 7 Ellen Aprill's thoughtful analysis should make us wary of
4. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and
A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit
Sector 78 (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/finalUPanel FinalReport.pdf
The report was the Independent Sector's response to the Senate Finance Committee's
invitation to self-regulate, rather than the subject of additional mandatory regulation. The
overarching principles that the panel chose to guide its recommendations were couched in
vague, somewhat aspirational terms, but its recommendations for government oversight were
somewhat narrowly focused on preventing particular acts of wrongdoing.
The
recommendations suggest only that government should ensure effective enforcement of the
law and deter abuse. The affirmative role of government enforcement is not only narrow,
but skewed in the direction of financial control. The recommendations are designed to
insulate the nonprofit sector in its substantive decision making by ensuring compliance with
procedural safeguards and disclosure. This approach mimics the approach of corporate law.
5. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
6. Currently, their rights are miniscule. In general, they lack standing to challenge the
use of their gifts. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995
(Conn. 1997); Alan F. Rothschild, Jr., The Dos and Don'ts of Donor Control (2004),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/estate/2004/2/RothschildDonorCtrl.pdf.
7. The Federal securities laws are only applicable to "public corporations," those that
have a large number of shareholders and significant assets. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000) (providing jurisdictional predicate for application of
federal law); see also SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2007); SEC
Accountability of Charitable Organizations:
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generally adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-type requirements for nonprofit
organizations. 8 Rooting out wrongdoing is never easy, and misdealing is
nothing new in (or out of) the charitable sector. 9 Public scrutiny, however,
has increased, creating the perception of a pressing problem where one
might not really exist. Increased donor control, particularly dead-hand
control, imposes costs on the legal system, which must devote public
resources to litigating and carrying out the will of donors who may be long
dead, and whose vision may be long outdated. Regardless of the outcome
of the Robertson/Princeton dispute analyzed so well by John Eason in this
book, the litigation has been costly in many ways.
Although it is unfortunate that there are insufficient resources to fully
enforce good nonprofit governance, I do not believe that limited
government resources are the central problem for nonprofit governance.
Rather, the calls for greater regulation have focused on these types of issues
because the core of what makes charities unique, desirable, and worth
subsidizing is somewhat ephemeral and virtually nonjusticiable.10 While
greater financial accountability might protect against certain abuses or
mismanagement, it seems to promise precious little in fostering the
affirmative public benefits for which charities exist, and threatens to
subordinate the mission-related objectives within the governance structure
of organizations.
This essay expresses concern over the creeping corporatization of the law
of charities, l ' and argues that these legal developments may inadvertently
undermine the most compelling characteristic of these organizations.
"Governments require no accountings of the methods by which nonprofit
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2007). State corporate law governs the internal
affairs for all corporations incorporated in the jurisdiction, but some states have special rules
for small corporations. For example, over forty-five states have adopted the Small Company
Offering Registration form, which is promulgated by the North American Securities
Administrators Association and applies to the sale of securities up to $1 million. See, e.g.,
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Q&A:
Small Business and the SEC § VII,
http://sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
8. Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of
Nonprofit Governance, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 765 (2007); see also Dana Brakman Reiser,
Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability,
38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 205 (2004).
9. See James J. Fishman, The Faithless Fiduciary and the Quest for Charitable
Accountability 1200-2005 (2007).
10. This is the perennial problem with mission accountability. See Brakman Reiser,
supra note 8, at 218; Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit
Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L.
Rev. 1485, 1528 (2003).
11. Scholars have identified a developing "policy of 'corporate law parallelism' [which]
seeks to pattern nonprofit corporate law after the law of for-profit or business corporations."
Robert A. Katz, Let CharitableDirectors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board
Discretion over a CharitableCorporation'sMission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 689, 690-91 (2005); see also Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.30 cmt. 1
(1986); Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., at xxxiii (Tentative Draft No. 1,2007);
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and
Regulation 152 (2004).
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organizations pursue their missions nor make any attempt to assure that
charitable assets are used effectively or efficiently."' 12 But governments
seem to be increasingly concerned with financial controls and structural
elements, creating a dangerous illusion that our goal in the charitable sector
is related to the bottom line. If we are too concerned with structural
protections, like board size and director independence requirements, we
may forget what those structures protect. 13 While it has been argued that
financial accountability is insufficient to ensure community relevance, 14 the
danger may be greater than ineffectiveness. Creating the wrong set of
incentives may distract those in control of charitable organizations from the
purposes for which such organizations exist.
In the conference proceedings, 15 Burton Weisbrod argued that
universities encourage college athletic coaches to sacrifice academics when
they compensate coaches more highly if their student-athletes win games
than if they excel academically. This essay follows through on that
intuition by applying it to nonprofit governance generally. It argues that if
we only create enforceable standards for the duties of loyalty and care-the
fiduciary obligations that nonprofit and for-profit directors share-and if we
create requirements of financial accountability only, then we should expect
directors to conform their behavior to those standards. But those standards
say nothing about charitable goals, and we can reasonably expect
individuals to more vigorously commit themselves to missions where they
have an incentive to do so. Some people are sufficiently self-motivated and
do not need any legal impetus for mission commitment, but it is at our peril
that we leave charitable goals to the good conscience of individuals.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Part II considers the
fiduciary duties of nonprofit boards and observes that the emphasis in the
law has shifted strongly toward equivalent obligations of loyalty and care
for directors of both business and nonprofit organizations. Next, in Part III,
I argue that the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith might be
sufficient for business corporations because, even in the absence of an
explicit obligation to pursue profit, there are sufficient forces encouraging
business managers to do just that. However, I maintain that business law
duties are inadequate as the sole fiduciary obligations of nonprofit boards
because the market mechanisms that function for business corporations are
either weaker or do not exist for nonprofit organizations. In Part IV, I argue
for a reinvigorated, but broader concept of obedience, which I describe as
"fidelity." The obligation would be largely aspirational, 16 as I am not
12. Fremont-Smith, supra note 11, at 2.
13. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76
Fordham L. Rev. 795 (2007).
14. See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 218 ("There is no clear, independent
metric for evaluating fealty to nonprofit mission."); Sasso, supra note 10, at 1527.
15. See Burton Weisbrod, Address at the Fordham Law Review Symposium: Nonprofit
Law, Economic Challenges, and the Futureof Charities(Mar. 30, 2007).
16. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standardsof Conduct and Standards
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 437 (1993) (explaining that a
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advocating a liability rule for nonprofit directors and managers who fail in
their devotion to their mission. I believe, however, that its existence is
central to the definition of the charitable sector and important as an anchor
in the legal regime. The signaling effect of a separate obligation that
applies only to those entrusted with nonprofit organizations is important
and codifies the public responsibility that nonprofit boards have. A
separate obligation establishes a norm that distinguishes the public role of
those in control of charities from the purely private obligations of those in
charge of business corporations.
I.

WHY IS THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF OBEDIENCE A STEPCHILD?

The directors of all corporations owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
to those corporations. The duty of care concerns attention to the director's
task: It requires that "when becoming informed in connection with their
decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function,
[directors] shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like
position would reasonably
believe appropriate
under similar
circumstances." 17 The duty of loyalty concerns conflicts of interest: It
requires that a director put the interests of the corporation ahead of his
personal interests. 18 Connected to both of these obligations is the
overarching requirement
of good faith, which inserts a subjective element
9
into directors' duties. 1
Some authorities identify a third fiduciary obligation that is unique to
nonprofit directors: the duty of obedience. A leading casebook defines this
duty as a "less recognized duty of board members . . . to carry out the

purposes of the organization as expressed in the [organizational
documents]. '20 Covering a mere three pages in that text, the duty of
obedience is clearly the stepchild to the duties of care and loyalty within the
nonprofit canon. Furthermore, the future of the duty of obedience is very
much at risk. Neither the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act nor the
statutes of any state includes a duty of obedience, even though many
statutes have codified the duties of care and/or loyalty. 2 1 The ALI's Draft
"standardof conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given
role," while a "standardof review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an
actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief'); see also
Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 8.30, 8.31 (2002); E. Norman Veasey, Juxtaposing Best Practices
and Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence-PartII, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Nov. 2004,
46, 46 n.10, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2004/November/46.pdf
("Aspirational standards of director conduct are not necessarily coextensive with the
standards ofjudicial review.").
17. Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b).
18. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (2006).
19. Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) provides, "Each member of the board of
directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."
20. James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations:
Cases and
Materials 219 (3d ed. 2006).
21. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 11, app. at 514 tbl.3.
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Principles reject a duty of obedience on the ground that such a duty
conflicts with "the obligation to keep the purpose of the charity current and
useful. '22
In her treatise, Marion Fremont-Smith also rejected it,
explaining, "To the extent the duty of obedience does not carry with it a
duty to assure that the trust is meeting contemporaneous needs, it does not
23
set forth an appropriate standard."
A. Trust Law Defines Obedience
It is not surprising that the duty of obedience fails the popularity
contest-it is unattractively narrow and formal. It has been interpreted to
require a rigid adherence to the purposes stated in an organization's
documents and therefore fails as a flexible norm requiring attention to
charitable goals. The understanding of obedience reflects the trust
law/corporate law tension that pervades the law of nonprofit organizations.
While it is not clear why different forms of organization for charities have
different legal standards applicable to the individuals controlling them, the
historical development of nonprofit law in this country has created different
rules for charitable corporations and charitable trusts. 24
Although
individuals starting nonprofit organizations may know nothing and care
little about whether their organization is a trust or a corporation, the law
implies different obligations for those managing charitable trusts than for
those managing charitable corporations. 25 The doctrine of obedience
"derives from trust law [under which] a director (trustee) must administer
the corporation's assets (trust) in a manner faithful to the expressed wishes
of the creator and donors, who rely on those express purposes when making
their contributions." 26 Strict trust law parallelism would also impose "a
trust on a charitable corporation's unrestricted gifts ... for those charitable
purposes set forth in its articles of incorporation (and perhaps those
manifested in its operations) at the time such gifts were received. ' 27 These
trust strictures impose severe limitations on the power exercised by trustees
and directors subject to them. Although the trust model has been applied to
corporations, 2 8 strict trust treatment for all contributions to nonprofit
29
corporations has been largely rejected.

22.
2007).
23.
24.
25.

Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., § 300 cmt. g(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
Fremont-Smith, supra note 11, at 226.
See generally Fremont-Smith, supra note 11.
See generally Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do

With It?, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 641 (2005); Katz, supra note 11.
26. Victoria B. Bjorklund et al., New York Nonprofit Law and Practice:

With Tax

Analysis § 11-4(a) (1997) (citing Mercury Bay Boating Club v. San Diego Yacht Club, 545
N.Y.S.2d 693 (1989)).
27. Katz, supra note 11, at 692.

28. The trust model was applied to California corporations prior to that state's adoption
of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations Act. See Pac. Home v. Los Angeles County,

264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. 1953) (providing that, where a charitable corporation organized for a
specific charitable purpose accepts assets, this "establishes a charitable trust for the declared
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, Some state courts have applied the duty of obedience to nonprofit
corporations, even though the statutes of those states do not mention the
duty. 30 In New York, the attorney general has decided that "the duty may
be inferred by the limitations imposed upon corporate activities as set forth
in the purposes clause of the certificate of incorporation (N-PCL §§ 201,
202 & 402(a)(2)) and the directors' and officers' obligations as the
corporate managers of the not-for-profit organization (N-PCL § 701 &
713)."31
The current understanding of the duty of obedience for corporate boards
reflects Daniel Kurtz's interpretation, which has been influential in the
literature. He wrote, "A director is charged with carrying out the purposes
of the organization, as expressed in the legal documents creating and
defining its mission ....

[D]iversion[] of corporate resources to other goals,

no matter how laudable, [is] not legally justifiable. ' 32 This approach takes
the narrowest perspective-imposing trust-like obligations on directors of
nonprofit corporations, despite the absence of trust-like standards in the
statutes that control the use of corporate funds. 33 Kurtz concedes that
corporate directors "may have considerable latitude in determining
precisely how such purposes can best be fulfilled. '34 The distinction he
makes seems to mirror the difference between cy pres and deviation in the
trust context-allowing directors to engage in deviation unilaterally, but
imposing a strict cy pres standard on purposes. For trusts, deviation
concerns changes in administration of a trust, while cy pres goes to the
heart of purpose and allows courts to approve changes in trust purposes
when the original purposes become impossible to carry out. 3 5 In practice, it
is often hard to tell whether a particular modification should be a cy pres or

corporate purposes as effectively as though the assets had been accepted from a donor who
had expressly provided in the instrument evidencing the gift that it was to be held in trust
solely for such charitable purposes"); cf Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang,
Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health CareEnterprise,5 Yale J. Health Pol'y
L. & Ethics 1, 66 (2005) (questioning whether pre-Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations

Act cases that impose a trust on unrestricted gifts to charitable corporations remain good law
in California).
29. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1578,
1597 (1992) (citing Denckla v. Independence Found., 193 A.2d 538, 541 (Del. 1963)).

30. See Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The ChangingAccountability Climate
and Resulting Demands for Improved "FiduciaryCapacity" Affecting the World of Public

Charities, 31 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 119, 127 (2004); see also Mass. Continuing Legal
Educ., Guidebook for Directors of Massachusetts Nonprofits § 3.1 (2005); Office of Minn.
Att'y
Gen.,
Fiduciary
Duties of Directors
of Charitable
Organizations,
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Charities/FiduciaryDuties.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).

31. N.Y. State Att'y Gen., The Regulatory Role of the Attorney General's Charities
Bureau 4 (2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.pdf,

32.
*33.
34.
35.

Daniel L. Kurtz, Board Liability: Guide for Nonprofit Directors 85 (1988).
See, e.g., N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 513 (McKinney 2004).
Kurtz, supra note 32, at 85 (citations omitted).
See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003).
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a deviation case. 36 Nevertheless, whether there is a deviation or cy pres, the
standard is squarely based on trust law principles.
Although the duty of obedience is rarely judicially enforced, it has
mostly been interpreted technically and narrowly, limiting the charitable
goals of the organizations involved. A number of old California cases took
a very strict view of obedience to the stated purposes of the organization.
In one case, the court stated,
[A]II the assets of a corporation organized solely for charitable purposes
must be deemed to be impressed with a charitable trust by virtue of the
express declaration of the corporation's purposes, and notwithstanding the
such assets as
absence of any express declaration by those who contribute
37
to the purpose for which the contributions are made.
One narrow approach to obedience is through the ultra vires doctrine.
While the ultra vires doctrine is nearly dead in the jurisprudence of forprofit corporations, it is potentially powerful in nonprofit enforcement if it
defines the contours of an enforceable obligation of obedience. Under the
traditional doctrine, an action is ultra vires if it is beyond the powers of the
corporation. The ultra vires approach implies that the duty of obedience is
specifically tied to the purposes in the corporation's internal documents,
and that actions beyond those purposes are not within the corporate powers.
In one case, a hospital was not allowed to cease performing the primary
purpose for which it was organized, regardless of its other charitable
activities. 38 The issue was presented in narrow, ultra-vires-type terms,
framing the question as whether the board exceeded its allowable powers by
taking an action outside the permitted purposes of the organization. A
recent New York case also approached the obedience question as one of
ultra vires, adopting a formal understanding of the doctrine. In the
compensation case of New York Stock Exchange President Richard
Grasso, 39 the court concluded that because Grasso had acted ultra vires, in
the corporate sense, he had violated his duty of obedience. In fact, the duty
of obedience seemed to pull little weight in the Grasso decision; the central
argument in that opinion was about care, and to a lesser extent, loyalty.

36. See In re Barnes Found., 69 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (C.P. Montgomery 2004) (applying
doctrine of deviation in considering major changes to foundation's operations); Rob
Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 Hastings L.J. 1111, 1112 n.2 (1993) (stating that
"distinction between substance and procedure is difficult to maintain"); see also Chris
Abbinante, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable Foundations: Wayward Trusteeship
and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 665 (1997); Ilana H. Eisenstein, Keeping
Charity in CharitableTrust Law: The BarnesFoundationand the Casefor Considerationof
Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1747 (2003).
37. Pac. Home v. Los Angeles County, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. 1953); see also Holt v.
Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964); Brown v. Mem.
Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
38. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 41 (Ct. App. 1977).
39. The New York Stock Exchange was not a tax-exempt charity, but was a New York
nonprofit corporation at the time of the dispute in the case. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso,
No. 401620/04, 2006 WL 3016952, at *59-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2006).
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This is consistent with the context in which obedience seems to arise in the
cases-apparently, a violation of obedience alone is insufficient to warrant
enforcement. But courts will mention obedience if other obligations are at
issue, consistent with the duty's status as a stepchild in the law of fiduciary
duties.
In an important decision that seems to enforce the duty of obedience
without a specific ultra vires element, a New York court denied Manhattan
40
Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital's (MEETH) petition to sell its assets.
Although the court found that the deal would not produce fair consideration
for the assets (which probably would have been sufficient to block the sale),
it is a contemporary case on the duty of obedience because the court also
grounded its decision on a finding that the charitable purposes of the
organization would not be achieved by the sale. 4 1 The deal contemplated
that the organization's traditional hospital facility be closed and replaced by
satellite clinic-type facilities. The attorney general opposed the sale and the
court would not allow it to proceed because the hospital had received, but
not considered, offers that would have preserved MEETH's acute care,
teaching, and research functions. 42 It is possible to read this case as a
narrow interpretation of obedience because the court required that MEETH
43
continue with its specific stated purpose-the operation of a hospital.
The most recent New York case on the issue took a measured view of
obedience and a more flexible approach to the purposes in the
organization's documents. In a dispute involving the Albright-Knox
Museum, a New York court allowed the museum to deaccession works in
the collection, and concluded that such deaccessioning would not create an
obedience concern. 44 The court allowed the museum to decide what kind of
art it should hold in carrying out its mission. 45 Perhaps this indicates a shift
to a more flexible and dynamic interpretation of obedience.
I B. Adopting a Flexible and Dynamic Interpretationof Obedience
The conflict between the stricter trust standard and the more flexible
corporate standard in determining appropriate levels of discretion allowed
to fiduciaries has hobbled the duty of obedience, making it a concept suited
to trust fiduciaries but problematic for their corporate counterparts who are
protected by the "best judgment rule," the nonprofit equivalent of the
business judgment rule that allows corporate directors space in which to
exercise their discretion.4 6 The narrow trust connotations of obedience,
40. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
41. Id. at 591-97.
42. Id. at 596-97.
43. That is not my reading of the case. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
44. Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Acad., No. 2007-2220, 2007 WL 840996, at *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2007).
45. Id. at *3.
46. This turn of phrase is revealing-business directors exercise business judgment, but
the directors of nonprofit organizations exercise an undefined type ofjudgment.
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which attach the duty to the purposes stated in a trust instrument or
corporate charter, have overshadowed the potential for a legal norm to
require commitment to a fundamental purpose to carry out charitable
mission for the public good.
Rather than replicate the hazy distinction of trust law in the corporate
context, the law would be better if we understood obedience at a more
abstract level. I believe that the cases that Kurtz cites 47 to support his
distinction are, in fact, better understood as the application of a more
abstract fiduciary duty, which I describe as "fidelity" rather than obedience,
in order to distinguish it from the rigid trust-bound interpretation that has
limited the doctrine. For example, Kurtz cites In re Multiple Sclerosis
Service Organization of New York, Inc. 48 as a deviation-type case, but I
believe that this case is better understood as more broadly defining the role
of corporate directors in meeting their duty of obedience. The dispute in
that case involved the choice of recipient organizations to receive the assets
of a liquidating charity. The directors chose four recipients, but not the
local chapter of the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, which sought to
intervene in the dissolution proceedings. The court's opinion explicitly
rejected the cy pres standard for corporations, giving directors engaged in
carrying out their fiduciary obligations the power to determine the scope of
their organization's mission. 49 The court also interpreted the New York
statute to require consideration of the activities of the organization, rather
than binding the directors to the purposes stated in the organizational
documents. 50
Rather than representing a deviation standard within
nonprofit corporate law, the case should stand for two important principles:
(1) that courts defer to the directors' judgment about the charitable goals of
the organization, and (2) that the duty of obedience is carried out broadly
with respect to consideration of the activities of the organization, 5' rather
than solely with reference to the purposes written in the documents.
Inclusion of activities, as well as purposes, in determining the content of the
duty of obedience, gives directors a dynamic responsibility in defining
those activities over time.
This understanding of obedience is empowering for directors. It also
gives substance to the obligation for directors of organizations that contain
indeterminate purpose clauses in their documents. The connection of
obedience to purposes stated in the organizational documents works in two
ways-it is too limiting for organizations with narrow purpose clauses but
meaningless for organizations with broad purpose clauses. It has long been

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Miami

See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of N.Y., Inc. 496 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1986).
Id. at 861-62.
Id. at 867.
See also Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 41 (Ct. App. 1977);
Retreat Found. v. Ervin, 62 So. 2d 748, 752 (Fla. 1952); Michael W. Peregrine,

CharitableTrust Laws and the Evolving Nature of the Nonprofit HospitalCorporation,30 J.
Health & Hosp. L. 11, 13 (1997).

2007]

RESISTING CORPORA TIZA TION

standard for the organizational documents of business corporations to
mimic the broadest enabling language of the statute, and nonprofit
organizations can do the same and dispense with naming any particular
charitable purpose.5 2 To be eligible for tax exemption, it is sufficient to
organize a nonprofit corporation for any purpose allowed in Internal
53
Revenue Code § 501(c)(3), without any more specifically stated purpose.
Thus, if obedience is about narrow adherence to the purposes stated in the
documents, then organizations that adopt the minimal necessary language to
qualify for exemption would seem to lack any requirement of obedience.
By focusing the obligation functionally on the regular activities of the
organization, the duty of obedience can be understood as highly contextual
and dynamic, reflecting the expectations of donors and the community in
which the organization operates and the judgments of the organization's
managers and directors. Compared to the formalistic cy pres trust standard,
this understanding of obedience is less restrictive than rigid adherence to
the purposes stated in the organization's documents for certain
organizations, but more restrictive for others, depending on how purposes
are defined by the organization's documents. This interpretation of
obedience guarantees a meaningful limitation based on charitable goals for
all organizations.
54
Those who reject the duty of obedience as a separate identifiable norm
The rigid
are undoubtedly responding to its technical narrowness.
connotations attached to it clash with the corporate business judgment rule
model that has characterized the modem trend in nonprofit corporate
governance, in which directors have broad power to change the
organization's priorities. 5 5 "[T]he modern trend is to apply corporate rather
than trust principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable
corporations, because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from

52. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that "[e]very corporation
incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity unless a more
limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation." § 3.01(a) (Exposure Draft 1986).
53. See generally IRS, Pub. No. 557, Tax Exempt Status for Your Organization 27
(2005) (displaying sample articles of incorporation).
54. Some of the most important scholars in this field (and participants in this
conference) are among this group. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and
Paternalismin State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 Ind. L.J. 937, 960-61 (2004) [hereinafter
Brody, Whose Public?];Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity FiduciaryLaw, 57 Md. L. Rev.
1400, 1406 n.30, 1475 (1998); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit
Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and ProposedReforms, 23 J. Corp. L. 631,
641-42 (1998); see also Fremont-Smith, supra note 11, at 226.
55. See Katz, supra note 11, at 692. The dispute between the majority and the dissent in
Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1985), seems to have been about
this point. Judge Matthew J. Jasen, in dissent, explained, "The theory advanced by the
majority, that a not-for-profit corporation lacks authority to amend its corporate charter to
change its corporate purpose, eviscerates the policy of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law
according charitable organizations broad latitude in corporate self-governance." Id. at 759

(Jasen, J., dissenting).
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those of their 'pure' corporate counterparts. ' 56 Requiring adherence to a
fixed mission seems inconsistent with the power that directors of nonprofit
corporations have to change the corporate mission by amending the
corporation's certificate of incorporation, 57 though courts have stated that it
would be appropriate for them to intervene with the directors' decisions in
instances in which "there is such a substantialdeparturefrom the charity's
dominant purpose as to amount to a perversion of it. . .. -58 There is no
definition of purpose in the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and
the default rule for purposes of a nonprofit corporation is "engaging in any
lawful activity." 59
This guts the notion of any justiciable violation
60
connected to corporate purpose.
This essay is sympathetic to those who reject the duty of obedience as
rigid and inconsistent with the general approach of expansive board
judgment adopted by contemporary scholars. Nevertheless, its main thesis

is that the law should include a legal requirement that directors commit
themselves to an organization's charitable mission.
I describe that
obligation as fidelity, in order to separate it from the traditional notion of

obedience to the purposes stated in an organization's documents. Unlike
56. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. (Sibley Hospital), 381 F. Supp. 1003,
1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.).

57. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 28, at 56 n.205 ("It has long been assumed that a
board may alter its mission by amending its articles of incorporation."); see also Banner
Health Sys. v. Stenehjem, No. A3-02-121, 2003 WL 501821 (D.N.D. Feb. 25, 2003)
(applying general corporate law principles under which the directors were virtually
unrestricted in their ability to direct disposition of the general funds of the corporation,
whether they were amending its charitable purposes or selling its assets and directing
disposition of the proceeds); Att'y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1020-21
(Mass. 1986) (recognizing a nonprofit corporation's board's authority to amend its articles of
incorporation to alter its mission); Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §§ 10.01, 10.02(b),
10.30 (1987); Katz, supra note 11, at 697 ("[Wjhere corporate law parallelism prevails, there
seems to be no intrinsic limit on the board's ability to alter the corporation's charitable
purposes, so long as the requisite procedures are followed."). But see Hahnemann Hosp.,
494 N.E.2d at 1021 (dictum) (commenting that a charitable corporation that amends its
articles lacks unfettered discretion to devote pre-amendment funds to new charitable
purposes that are not similar or are even contradictory to its prior charitable purposes). In
some states, the board may not amend the articles without outside approval. See, e.g., Ind.
Code § 23-17-17-1 (2005).
The N-PCL requires a not-for-profit corporation to obtain State Supreme Court
approval, upon notice to the Attorney General, before it may (1) amend its
purposes or powers (N-PCL Article 8), (2) sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of all
or substantially all of its assets (N-PCL Article 5), (3) merge or consolidate (NPCL Article 9) or (4) dissolve (N-PCL Article 10). The Attorney General is a
necessary party to the court proceeding and may file objections to the proposed
terms. However, the court is the ultimate decision-maker.
Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., The Regulatory Role of the Attorney General's Charities
Bureau 22-23 (2003), availableat http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.pdf.
58. Taylor v. Baldwin, 247 S.W.2d 741, 750, 757 (Mo. 1952) (en banc) (holding that
Bamard Hospital's acceptance of the affiliation contract was a reasonable exercise of the
board's discretionary powers and that the proposed affiliation would not depart from
Barnard's charter purpose).
59. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 3.01(a).
60. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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the trust law notion, obedience is a flexible obligation that empowers
directors to decide the course an organization will take. This duty
incorporates a board's power to change the purposes or the mission
statement of the organization and never requires a board's obedience to an
outworn purpose in place of dynamic and responsive decision making.
Nevertheless, I believe that some legal requirement is necessary and
important because, without it, there is nothing in the law of nonprofit
governance that affirmatively requires directors to strive for charitable
goals. While loyal and careful governance, as those duties have been
defined in the business context, might further a corporation's mission, I am
not convinced that they always will. A unique obligation applicable only to
nonprofit boards has an important salience and performs a signaling
function that makes it worthwhile, even if much of its content could
conceivably be incorporated into other duties.
III. CORPORATE LAW OBLIGATIONS DO NOT
QUITE FIT NONPROFIT BOARDS

There are advantages to adopting business law standards for nonprofit
organizations. Where obligations are comparable, courts, attorneys general,
and boards should use the corporate law standards to determine expected
behavior for nonprofit boards. The wealth of precedent and interpretation
of state law fiduciary obligations, particularly under Delaware law, should
be helpful in guiding board members and their advisors. But there are
many situations in which the rules applicable to for-profit organizations fail
to capture the needs of nonprofits, and a tailored legal regime is necessary.
If there is anything unique about charities, 6 1a one-size-fits-all approach to
charities and businesses cannot recognize it.
A. The Absence of a Market and a ProfitMotive Matters
In both for-profit and nonprofit organizations, boards owe duties of care
and loyalty to their organizations, and in neither type of institution does the
satisfaction of those obligations ensure success in pursuing the
organization's goal. For business corporations, there is no guarantee that
adherence to these fiduciary duties will translate into profits for
shareholders, but, along with other forces, these duties encourage business
executives and directors to make profits for the corporation. Care and
loyalty may contribute to business success: If directors may not put their
personal financial interests ahead of the corporation's interests-the
requirements of loyalty-then there likely will be more money left in the
corporate till for the shareholders. If they must pay attention to the major
events in the corporation's life and oversee the work of the managers-the
61. Delaware, the preeminent state of incorporation for business corporations, and an
increasingly popular state for nonprofit incorporations, has no separate nonprofit corporation
statute, so, by definition, the obligations of nonprofit corporate directors must be precisely
coextensive with the obligations of for-profit directors.
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requirements of care-they may make better decisions about corporate
strategy and prevent mismanagement and loss.
For businesses, it is the market that drives the profit motive most
strongly, rather than the obligations of care and loyalty that underpin it. For
example, executive compensation is often stock or stock-option based, so
that managers stand to personally gain when shareholders prosper. There is
a market for executive talent that judges managers by the profitability of the
companies they run. The market for corporate control is also a powerful
incentive-managers who want to keep their posts must strive to maximize
efficiency to prevent unwanted takeover offers from bidders who believe
they can improve the profitability of the business. Derivative and class
action litigation by shareholders is also a disciplining force, since litigation
is a regular by-product of a falling stock price, and the mere threat of those
such lawsuits provides ample incentive for corporate managers to keep their
focus on the bottom line. In business corporations, it is reasonable to
assume that investors share a common desire to make profits, so market
mechanisms that encourage attention to profit making help directors and
managers stay focused on the appropriate goals. As a supplement to those
mechanisms, the law can limit the extraneous goals that managers might
62
impose on a corporation.
The market-driven regime breaks down for nonprofit organizations on
two fronts: First, there is no market to keep the focus of individuals in
control of nonprofits on a particular goal. Second, the goals of nonprofit
stakeholders-including donors, beneficiaries, and the larger public-are
likely to be more ephemeral and diverse than the common profit motive
shared by the residual beneficiaries of businesses. Consequently, we can
expect that the fiduciary model alone, without the assistance the market
provides for business corporations, will be less effective than it is for
business corporations. Nonprofit governance is not bolstered by either a
market for corporate control or derivative litigation that focuses attention on
the charitable mission. Litigation by individuals on behalf of a charitable
organization against the directors or officers of that organization for
misdeeds is impossible because standing rules prevent virtually all
individuals from bringing suit. Only attorneys general, directors, and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are in positions to haul nonprofit directors
into court at all, so the threat of crushing litigation and the aggressive
plaintiffs' bar are not an issue. Performance-based compensation, while
familiar in the charitable sector, is not directly related to anything as
concrete as financial-statement profitability or stock price, so its incentive

62. The lobbying cases recognize that shareholders might have diverse interests on
issues not directly related to the business of the corporation. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978) (rejecting the theory of speaker's rights for First
Amendment protection of corporate speech in favor of listener's rights, which does not
depend on a uniform speaker's intent in the corporation).
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effect is less direct than for business executives.

63

There is no clear force

that drives nonprofit directors and managers to achieve the good results for
which their organizations exist; they must be self-motivated to an extent not
expected of individuals in business organizations who are impelled by both
fear and greed from external forces. While one could argue that attention to
executive compensation in nonprofits and regulation to keep nonprofit
salaries artificially low 6 4 self-regulates for individuals committed to
mission, it alternatively might select for less-skilled managers who cannot
get higher-paying work elsewhere.
In a similar vein, it is possible to understand the selection of board
members by particular organizations as a kind of market that identifies
individuals who are most passionate about an organization's charitable
mission. If we are confident that the individuals most passionate about an
organization's goals make up the board, then we may not need a legally
cognizable obligation to be committed to mission, but I am not convinced
that this "market" functions very well. While many people are drawn to
particular charities because they are dedicated to the organization's
purposes, there are many individuals who choose to serve on boards for
other reasons. Some are motivated as a favor to friends who are serving, or
as a favor to an organization's executive director whom they want to
support. Others are motivated by the prestige that board service can bring,
and thus might choose a more prestigious board over a more obscure one as
a status symbol, rather than out of a particular commitment to the work of
the higher-profile organization. Some people are motivated by a general
sense of obligation to give back to the community, though they may see the
financial commitments that go with board membership as satisfying that
obligation and believe that active involvement with mission is unnecessary.
Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that boards are necessarily selfmotivated by charitable goals.
Even individuals who feel a strong personal commitment may not be as
motivated by that commitment as individuals stimulated by the external
forces that encourage for-profit managers. The personal commitment that
motivates charitable works is hard to measure and may be susceptible to
fatigue. There are external pressures that motivate nonprofit managers, but
they do not compare to those that motivate business managers. For
example, nonprofit boards must worry about the loss of tax exemption. It is
clear, however, that the threat of an organization's loss of exemption is
remote and not nearly as compelling as the profit-making incentive that puts
63. See Pablo Eisenberg, Opinion, Skyrocketing CEO Pay Raises Questions for
Charities, Chron. of Philanthropy, Feb. 8, 2007, at 37; Scott Westcott, Merit Pay Becomes
More Popular,Study Finds, Chron. of Philanthropy, Mar. 22, 2007, at 15.
64. See L.D. 1792, 123d State Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2007), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/billtexts/LD 179201.asp (limiting compensation

for officers and directors of nonprofits that receive significant public funding). For a critique
of
that
bill,
see
Charity
Governance,
http://www.charitygovemance.com/charity-governance/2007/05/maine-state-sen.html (May
8, 2007, 15:25).
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money straight into an executive's pocket. Without any corollary to those
market mechanisms in the nonprofit sector, there needs to be a regulatory
substitute. In nonprofit organizations, where market mechanisms do not
operate, we should expect a higher level of regulation to compensate for the
difference of incentives. 65
B. Can Care, Good Faith,and/orLoyalty EnsureFidelity?
Professor Harvey J. Goldschmid has argued that obedience is properly
understood as a component of care. 66 If the duty of care can embody the
norms of fidelity to charitable mission, there is no need for a separate
fiduciary obligation. Obedience and care are closely intertwined because a
board's consideration of the most effective use of an organization's human
and financial resources requires both care and fidelity. However, the
responsibilities implied by both duties are not always identical. An
understanding of care that embodies fidelity to charitable mission diverges
from the corporate conception of care, frustrating the notion that business
and nonprofit directors have the same obligations. To include the norm
embodied in obedience as fidelity, the duty of care must include affirmative
obligations to act on the part of directors and officers, and must be flexible
enough to account for the different affirmative obligations of nonprofit
directors and for-profit directors.
In the corporate context, the duty of care seems primarily concerned with
information gathering and attention to relevant facts in making decisions.
In the corporate context, however, the duty of care does not impose a
substantive obligation to manage in any particular way. The Model
Business Corporation Act treats the duty of care as an obligation to become
informed 67 and the statutes about care are largely concerned with situations
when directors are allowed to rely on information provided by others. 68 In
the nonprofit context, there may not be enough content within the duty of
care for it to do the work of requiring adherence to mission. A wellinformed board could know that a charity spends most of its resources and
energies running a business or planning galas, but having that information
is not the same as obligating the board to change the course of the
organization's activities. In the business context, it may be fair to assume
that if one is paying attention, then one will manage the corporation in a
way that protects shareholders because there are so many extralegal forces

65. While "takeovers" happen in the nonprofit sector, they are not a disciplinary tool that
targets waste and mismanagement. Conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status has been a
big issue in the health-care sector, but such takeovers only tangentially affect the mission
objectives. Combinations that reduce wasteful duplication by different organizations do
sometimes occur, but the proliferation of organizations suggests that duplication is created
more often than it is reduced. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Environmental Groups Join Forces,
Wash. Post, May 15, 2007, at A13.

66. Goldschmid, supra note 54, at 641.
67. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (2002).

68. See id. at § 8.30(e); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 14 1(e) (2001).
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that incentivize corporate managers to pursue profit. But, as Professor
Goldschmid has recognized, "[t]he obligation of nonprofit directors and
officers with respect to the corporation's mission creates a more difficult
and complex decision-making process for them than for their for-profit
peers." 69 If the duty of care is powerful enough to subsume obedience, then
it should correspondingly include the obligation to pursue profit for
business corporation directors, but it does not directly include that
obligation. The furthest that the business law jurisprudence has progressed
toward attaching affirmative obligations to the duty of care is the
corporation's obligation to70 "shop" a company once the board has
determined that it is for sale.
To illustrate the relationship between care and obedience, consider the
case of Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital v. Spitzer,7 1 which I cited
above at its face value for the proposition that the New York court
interpreted obedience in the narrow sense of adherence to the organizational
and prevented the sale of the hospital because the duty forbade
documents,
it. 72 Though related to mission, the major problem in that case seems to
have been a lapse in care-the board failed to determine, prior to deciding
to sell the hospital real estate, that outpatient clinics would be a better use of
73
the organization's resources than would running a traditional hospital.
According to this case, the core content of care is information based, and a
board fails to satisfy its duty of care if it pays insufficient attention to
information readily available before making a decision. 74 In MEETH, the
court was concerned about the management process and whether the
directors considered relevant information in that process. The MEETH
board's decision-making process was flawed because it approached the
problem backward-they first decided to sell and then considered what to
do with the money. These are the core concerns of a care analysis, but not
an obedience analysis, which is best interpreted as related to the substance
of decisions.

69. Goldschmid, supra note 54, at 641.
70. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369-70 & n.37 (Del. 1993)
("[The] directors were inadequately informed (of alternatives, or of the consequences of

executing a merger and related agreements). An auction is a way to get information. A preor post-agreement market-check mechanism is another, less effective but perhaps less risky,
way to get information. A 'lock-up' is suspect because it impedes the emergence of
information in that an alternative buyer that would pay (or would have paid) more is less
likely to emerge once such an impediment is in place." (citation omitted)).
71. 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
72. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
73. The board may not have even realized it was making the decision it made. The court
stated, "[T]he minutes show, the Board did not seem to believe that it was actually closing
the Hospital. One has to wonder exactly what the Board thought it was doing." MEETH,
715 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
74. MEETH is actually quite reminiscent of the classic Delaware case that held directors
liable for a breach of the duty of care. In that case, the board decided to sell the company
without properly investigating whether the price was adequate. See Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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If the MEETH directors had first fulfilled their duty to be informed, and
then concluded that they should sell the hospital so they could provide
better care for the medical conditions they were organized to ameliorate, the
court would likely have concluded that they satisfied their obedience
obligation, as well as their care obligation. This is why the obedience
question is tied up with the care question: In some circumstances, the same
evidence will show that both obligations are satisfied. Because the MEETH
board had not based its decision on sufficient investigation, the court was
not prepared to give it the benefit of the best judgment rule, which would
have protected the substantive decision the board made about what to do
with the organization's resources. If the board had first consulted the
doctors and experts in the medical field and concluded that the hospital
services provided by MEETH were no longer needed in New York City, the
court should have deferred to the board's judgment under general corporate
law principles. The board and the doctors were certainly in a better position
than the court to exercise judgment about whether the services they were
offering were underutilized or redundant and whether they could, in an
alternative organizational structure, provide better medical care for people
suffering from particular diseases. The MEETH board might have been
required to undergo the procedure for amending their corporate documents,
but they had the statutory power to do so. 75 The essence of obedience is the
substantive obligation on which the duty of care helps a board to focus. To
require a hospital to continue to offer surgical procedures after the medical
community has shifted away from those procedures to safer or less intrusive
nonsurgical methods is perverse, and no reasonable interpretation of
obedience should require it. It appears from the opinion that the attorney
general's office was not particularly interested in enforcing such a rigid
conception of the duty of obedience but was more concerned about the
organization receiving fair value for its assets. 76 A well-informed MEETH
board committed to its mission may still have had a problem in the
litigation because the court found that it failed to get the highest price for
77
the assets.
75. They had, apparently, started that process. MEETH, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
76. The attorney general's office seemed most concerned about the sufficiency of
consideration to be paid in the deal, and that a fair auction would be held. Id. at 587. Even if
MEETH satisfied its care obligation and determined to sell its real estate and move the
hospital operation intact to a less valuable location in the city, the attorney general should
still have objected to the sale because it allowed the loss of assets from the charitable sector.
The board had inexplicably voted to sell the real estate for less than the appraisal they had
received. Id. at 581.
77. Under the first prong of the test in New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 511
(McKinney 2004), which MEETH had to satisfy for the court to approve the deal, the board

had to get a fair and reasonable price for the assets sold. Since the deal involved a sale of
some assets to a developer, some of the assets would no longer be used in the charitable
sector. If MEETH had dissolved, it would have been permitted to distribute its assets to
another functionally similar organization without any consideration. If the deal in MEETH
had been simpler and MEETH's facility became part of Sloane-Kettering's cancer center, the

obedience question would have been isolated, front and center. In that case, I can imagine a
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Even if care could do the work of obedience, it is preferable to have a
separate affirmative obligation that makes clear that nonprofit directors and
officers have different obligations than their for-profit counterparts. If
nothing else, a separate duty of obedience to the organization's mission
highlights the distinction between governing a business and governing a
charity. If it is merely a signal of the importance of mission, the signaling
effect is worthwhile. Separating out a duty of obedience from the duty of
care makes it more apparent to directors with little preparation for nonprofit
governance that their job specifically includes a substantive obligation to
actively carry out the charity's mission.
The ALI Draft Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations turns to
good faith and loyalty, rather than care, to provide the substantive content
that I am arguing should be provided by a separate duty of obedience
understood as fidelity. It treats good faith as an overarching obligation that
imbues both care and loyalty with the subjective requirement to act in the
charity's best interests. 7 8 Loyalty is defined as acting in a manner the board
member "reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the charity, in
light of its stated purposes." 79 Both of these descriptions include attention
to the goals of the charity's work, the core of obedience, and as with care,
good faith and loyalty are certainly tied up with the organization's
purposes. Nevertheless, I am wary about good faith carrying that burden in
charity governance because the ALI's description seems to go beyond the
understanding of good faith in the corporate context. The obligation of
good faith sets too low a bar in the governance of business organizations.
Even at its strongest, for example, in the Delaware Chancery Court's
Disney opinion, the obligation of good faith only required that directors not
act with complete disregard to the consequences of their decisions. 80 Good
faith, thus, means that directors may not completely ignore their
responsibilities, which falls significantly short of an affirmative obligation
to carry out the charity's mission.
Loyalty may be more a promising instrument of obedience than good
faith because the ALI definition of loyalty incorporates mission-it
describes loyalty specifically as loyalty to the charitable purpose of the
organization, rather than simply loyalty to the organization. 8 1 In addition,
the vernacular understandings of loyalty and obedience are similar, so a
board deciding, after sufficient investigation and consultation, that there was sufficient eye
and ear care in New York City, but insufficient cancer care, and a court allowing the board
to amend the articles to allow the assets to be so used.
78. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., § 300 cmt. g(l), reporter's note 10
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
79. Id. § 310. The comment to that section describes fiduciary duties as running to the
charitable purposes. Id. § 310 cmt. a(l).
80. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (alleging
breach of good faith when "defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded
their responsibilities").

81. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., § 310 cmt. a(1) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
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board member untrained in nonprofit service might reasonably expect that
loyalty implies commitment to the goals of the organization. However, the
same problem that makes me wary about the breadth of good faith leads to
concern that loyalty would not clearly include a robust obligation of
fidelity.
The business law fiduciary concept of loyalty is about
subordinating one's personal interests to the interests of the corporation: it
arises in the context of interested-director transactions, controlled
corporation acquisitions, and executive compensation. There are equivalent
situations in the nonprofit sector for some loyalty issues. For example, the
interested-director transaction raises the same issues for business
corporations and nonprofit organizations. Where the law establishes
procedural mechanisms for addressing conflicts of interest in transactions
where the director has an interest on both sides, 82 it is reasonable that the
same mechanisms should apply whether a fiduciary sells property to a
business or a nonprofit on whose board he serves.8 3 While some have
suggested raising or lowering the standards for nonprofit directors
compared to for-profit directors,8 4 there are enough similarities
with respect
85
to those types of transaction to justify a uniform standard.
The conflict-of-interest issues generally associated with loyalty, which
are amenable to procedural protections, 86 are not quite the same as an
obligation of obedience.
Such a duty requires adherence to the
organization's mission, even where an individual's personal interests are
not implicated at all. To incorporate fidelity into the duty of loyalty
requires that the duty of loyalty move beyond mere consideration of an
individual's personal interest and embrace a more affirmative obligation to
the organization's particular vision. This more active and operational
notion of loyalty seems out of place in the larger context of the structural
loyalty issues that arise in corporate law. Furthermore, the object of a
director's duty of loyalty is the key part of obedience as loyalty, but that
object is less precise and less personified for a nonprofit organization. For
business corporations, fiduciary obligations run to the entity, as they do for
nonprofit corporations, but it would be odd to describe directors as
obligated to make widgets, though that would seem to be a parallel
interpretation to the mission obligation for nonprofits.
82. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (2007) (describing procedural mechanisms to
approve conflict of interest transaction).
83. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.31(a)-(c) (Exposure Draft 1986)
(describing procedural mechanisms to approve a conflict of interest transaction).
84. See George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App.
1954) (lowering the standard for volunteer directors); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 623 (1981) (raising the standard for

nonprofit directors).
85. This is the position of many commentators. See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 54, at

649 (accepting parallel standards, but calling for increased scrutiny of certain conflict of
interest transactions).
86. An independent committee of the board is a common mechanism for addressing
divided loyalties of a controlling shareholder. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 669
A.2d 79, 81 (Del. 1995).
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In sum, it seems that loyalty and care are very much enmeshed with
obedience, but I am not convinced that they encompass the scope of
obligation embodied in a separate duty. In the business context, the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty are composed largely of procedural or structural
elements, as opposed to substantive ones. Adherence to mission is a
substantive determination, so any obligation defined by process alone is
insufficient to regulate it. In addition, a regime that limits the fiduciary
duties to care and loyalty, without obedience, may foster an inappropriate
balance of authority and discretion between managers and boards. Those
duties alone make it more likely that boards concern themselves only with
financial controls and procedures, leaving development of mission to the
professionals who work for the organization. As many charity boards are
large and some board members see their major role as fund-raiser for the
organization, a standard of behavior that includes only care and loyalty
shifts responsibility to the executive director and staff for mission
accomplishment. While an organization's professional staff may have
greater knowledge and/or greater personal passion for the charitable
mission, the board is an invaluable resource for mission strategy. If
nonprofit organizations are to be governed by boards, then boards must not
micromanage, but they must at least set policies and consider strategic plans
for the organization. A model of fiduciary duties limited to care and loyalty
emphasizes the board's important role as monitor, but diminishes its other
crucial governance functions.
C. A Duty That Capturesthe Public Nature of Nonprofits
Beyond the differences that arise from the lack of a market, which alone
should make us wary about adopting the corporate model wholesale into
nonprofit law, the nature of the fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care
need more definition in the nonprofit world. Unlike the obligations of
corporate directors for the benefit of shareholders,8 7 fiduciary obligations to
a charitable organization are not as clearly for the benefit of any single
identifiable interest. It is possible that the obligations protect the interests
of donors, who simply take the place of shareholders in corporations that
lack them; the mechanisms designed to protect shareholders in the business
corporation can translate well enough into protection for the donors in the
nonprofit organization.
To the extent that we think about business
corporations as agglomerations of shareholder money, and charities as

87. Corporate directors may not elevate the interest of other stakeholders above the
interest of shareholders, because they may then breach their duty to shareholders. See
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986). Even
in states with so-called other constituency statutes, directors may consider the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders, but their obligation to shareholders is still paramount. See Eric
W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 14, 94 (1992) ("Constituency interests may figure in a board's deliberations,
but decisions to defend against a tender offer ... may not significantly disfavor the long-

term interests of shareholders." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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conduits for donor money, the corporate model might be acceptable. Some
of the literature takes this donor-centered approach. 88 The duty of
obedience, like the other obligations in the nonprofit context, might then be
89
in the service of protecting donors' implicit or explicit expectations.
Then, we could easily answer the question posed in the title of this essay by
asserting that it is to protect the interest of donors.
Protection of donors seems too narrow for the purposes of nonprofit
governance. Excessive protection for the interests of donors threatens the
statutory power of directors to manage an organization 90 and creates a real
danger that donors may cause "illegitimate mission creep" by diverting the
purposes of the organization away from the goals and activities chosen by
directors and managers. 9 1 Without additional legal protections, donors have
tremendous power under contract law, as they define the terms of their
gifts. 92 A donor-centered perspective on nonprofit fiduciary duties
conceives of the charitable organization as essentially private, and ignores
the crucial public interest in the governance of nonprofit organizations and
the mechanisms by which they determine their missions.
A conception of nonprofit governance as a struggle between donors and
managers is too shallow, even though it parallels the corporate law
conception in which shareholders and managers are in a principal-agent
perspective for nonprofit
relationship. 93 The manager-centered

88. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 32, at 85; Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-ProfitScandal in
the Nonprofit World: Should States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit
Corporations?, 95 Geo. L.J. 831, 842 (2007). But see Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing:
Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of CharitableFiduciaries?,23 J. Corp. L. 655, 671
(1998) ("The analogy between nonprofit patrons... and for-profit shareholders breaks down
on an absolutely fundamental point. Patrons, unlike shareholders, have no proprietary
interest in the organization's residual worth.").
89. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 213 ("When individuals opt to become
affiliated with a nonprofit, as volunteers, donors, members, staff, or beneficiaries, they
expressly or implicitly rely on [its mission statement]."). In Queen of Angels Hospital v.
Younger, the court pointed to the fact that the organization had solicited funds for hospital
purposes as a reason for disallowing use of those funds for outpatient clinics. 136 Cal. Rptr.
36, 41 (Ct. App. 1977); see also Trustees of Rutgers Coll. v. Richman, 125 A.2d 10, 26 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1956) (recognizing that a principal rationale of the duty of obedience is
the reliance of donors on an organization's faithfulness to its purpose).
90. See Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act, § 8.01(b) (1986) ("[A]ll corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the affairs of the corporation managed
under the direction of, its board.").
91. Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 272.
92. Cf Nicole Lewis, Controversy over Donor's Role Causes Smithsonian to Lose
$36.5-Million, Chron. of Philanthropy, Feb. 21, 2002, at 16 (noting that the Smithsonian lost
most of a $38 million pledge from the Catherine B. Reynolds Foundation to underwrite an
exhibit on American achievers, after Reynolds determined that the exhibit would not focus
enough on "the power of the individual").
93. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 657 (Del. Ch. 1988). I do not
find the principal-agent analysis for business corporations particularly compelling either,
since directors of business corporations have statutory authority to manage their companies.
The agency cost analysis that arises from this perspective differs for nonprofit and for-profit
organizations. See Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable
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organizations is insufficiently responsive to both the private interests that
donors legitimately have, and the public interest of stakeholders with
competing visions. While managers are likely to be in the best position to
define and direct the organization because they are in the position with
greatest information, their discretion must be tempered by a legal standard
that affirms the charitable mission and that donors can rely on when they
choose to support a particular organization.
In the corporate context, tremendous discretion for corporate directors,
coupled with strict legal requirements for disclosure and process, sets the
terms of a nexus of private contracts. Corporate managers are not permitted
to mislead investors in taking their money, but they can decide how to run
the company with the money they have amassed once they have it, subject
to minimal government oversight and limited shareholder participation.
This is the bargain that shareholders strike when they invest, and we can
accept it, given that neither party was obligated to enter into the contract in
the first place. For charitable organizations, the contract includes the public
at large, which has no choice about participating.
Some commentators have identified the public interest on the beneficiary
side of charitable organization, but have characterized the donor side as
purely private. 94 But it is more accurate to describe the public as partners in
the creation of charitable organizations on account of the charitable
contribution deduction that subsidizes a donor's original gift, and the
government's acceptance of the responsibility to enforce restrictions on
gifts in perpetuity. While government may not be a direct funder or donor,
the public is a financial partner in every charitable organization that is
eligible to receive deductible contributions and exemption from income
tax. 95 These subsidies, in addition to other privileges that charities enjoy,
give them a truly public aspect from their inception, and the public has an
interest in maximizing the effectiveness of an organization in carrying out
its charitable purposes. Charities are subject to more mandatory rules and
higher levels of government oversight precisely because they are more
public than business corporations. For the same reason, they are also
entitled to government benefits to which business corporations lack access.
Gifts and Organizations?,2000 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 19-22; Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs
and Oversight of CharitableOrganizations, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 227, 227-29.

94. See Katz, supra note 11, at 710.

95. This discussion about the public/private nature of nonprofit organizations assumes a

donative organization in which contributions are significant, and the public subsidy under
the charitable contribution deduction is meaningful. But many organizations are funded
through other means. Of course, public funding argues for public interest. But even
organizations heavily financed by fees paid by individuals or private institutions, such as
universities and hospitals (though Medicare and Medicaid are significant public sources of
funding) have a strong public dimension that derives from other government oversight, such
as certification and licensing schemes. Hospitals are heavily regulated for public health
reasons and even for-profit universities need to comply with accreditation procedures.
Nonprofit organizations, such as universities, that depend on fees may raise particular
concerns about market failure and may have a uniquely important role to play in civic
society.
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An additional problem with treating donors as shareholder equivalents
arises when there is not a single major donor, but rather a group of diverse
donors to an organization. The concerns of donors may diverge or even
conflict, strengthening the public interests compared to the private interests
of donors. The private perspective on charitable purposes is only coherent
for charities where a single individual or small group of donors started a
charity with a very specific idea about its mission. But it weakens as we
consider public charities funded by many individuals and institutions, each
of whom might have an independent reason for choosing a particular
charity. Recognizing that charities are public partnerships at their creation
alters the public/private dynamic of charities so that there is never a wholly
96
private interest to be protected.
Thus, to treat the directors of charities like business corporation directors,
and to treat donors like shareholders, is to miss the role that charities play in
public life. Increased participation by donors may reset the balance
between donors and directors/managers of charities, but that participation
does not guarantee integrity of charitable mission to the class of
beneficiaries or the larger public. If government oversight of charities is
equal to government oversight of business corporations, then the public's
interest, by definition, has not received sufficient attention. A distinct
obligation for directors, coupled with government oversight of that
obligation, is necessary to address the unique public/private nature of
nonprofit organizations.
The distinction between the public and private aspects of organizations
uniquely involves the duty of obedience. For duty of care and duty of
loyalty, there is not as much of a conflict between the public and private
conception of the organizations. Whether the law protects donors in
particular, or the public interest in charitable works more broadly, the duty
of loyalty would have the same content-both private donor interests and
public interests are harmed by diversion of charitable assets into private
hands. A similar analysis is also appropriate for the duty of care-both
private donor interests and public interests are harmed if directors pay no
attention to whether charitable assets are invested poorly or mismanaged by
others, and all individuals charged with managing institutions should be
required to pay attention to their task-not a very demanding threshold.
The public/private nature of charities is important in defining boards'
responsibility to their missions. The private perspective that treats donors
as shareholders supports the narrow and technical interpretation of
obedience described above. 97 That perspective allows donations to be
understood as contracts between organizations and their donors to pursue
specific goals: if a donor gives to a charity with a particular purpose in its
96. This perspective would suggest less dead-hand control for donors than the law has
generally accepted. Even in the most restrictive trust instruments, regulators would have an
obligation to carry through on the expectations of public investment implicit in the subsidy
provided by the donor's government partner.
97. See supra Part II.A.
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organizational documents, then we enforce that donor's expectations by
requiring adherence to that narrow purpose, which we impute to the donor.
Allowing funds to support broader charitable uses would be contrary to
those private expectations, even though those broader uses might be a more
efficient and effective use of a charity's funds, both in the opinion of the
charity's managers and directors and the broader public. The public
perspective on fiduciary duties of nonprofits allows a much broader
interpretation of obedience because the public interest in charitable goals is
necessarily much broader than the interest of individual donors. Some
98
cases seem to embrace this public perspective on mission accountability.
There are other provisions in the laws of states with special nonprofit
statutes, outside the definition of fiduciary duties, that recognize this public
nature of nonprofit organizations and distinguish them from businesses.
For example, the important role of a court or the attorney general in
reviewing proposed amendments to an organization's certificate of
incorporation reflects a public view of the nonprofit corporation. 99 It
signals the interest of outsiders in the mission of the organization. The
court's or attorney general's participation substitutes for that of
beneficiaries who lack standing to challenge any changes in corporate
purpose. 100 An expansive approach to the class of potential beneficiaries
gives directors, courts, and the attorney general more freedom to interpret
charitable mission.
Recognizing the public/private nature of nonprofit organizations is
increasingly important as more for-profit organizations describe their work
as "social entrepreneurship." Both charities and businesses are able to do
good for society-they are both in positions to improve our standard of
living, protect the earth, lift individuals out of poverty, etc. 10 1 Nobody
claims that good works are the unique province of nonprofit organizations.

98. See generally Denckla v. Independence Found., 193 A.2d 538 (Del. 1963); Holden
Hosp. Corp. v. S. Ill. Hosp. Corp., 174 N.E.2d 793 (Il. 1961) (recognizing that duty places
outer limits on what an organization may do by way of modifying its activities without

invocation of some representative of the public interest).
99. See, e.g., N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 804(a)(ii) (McKinney 2004).
Every certificate of amendment of a corporation classified as type B or type C
under section 201 (Purposes) which seeks to change or eliminate a purpose or
power enumerated in the corporation's certificate of incorporation, or to add a
power or purpose not enumerated therein, shall have endorsed thereon or annexed
thereto the approval of a justice of the supreme court of the judicial district in
which the office of the corporation is located. Ten days' written notice of the
application for such approval shall be given to the attorney-general.

Id.
100. See Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985);
Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 415 N.E.2d 919, 821 (N.Y. 1980); Tr. of Sailors' Snug Harbor v.
Carmody, 105 N.E. 543, 545 (N.Y. 1914).
101. I have previously argued that the distinction that the tax law makes between business
expenses and charitable gifts of corporations is indefensible, and that allowing corporations
to deduct all payments to charity as business expenses may help maximize the social good
produced by corporations. Linda Sugin, EncouragingCorporate Charity, 26 Va. Tax. Rev.
125 (2006).
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So what distinguishes nonprofit charity from for-profit social
entrepreneurship? I believe that the distinction relates to the duty of
obedience to mission, and that the distinction between philanthropic
organizations and business organizations, as a legal matter, is about the
fundamental obligations of directors and the parties to whom the directors
owe these obligations. The absence of a duty of obedience, the one unique
responsibility of nonprofit boards, is a problem in the face of increased forprofit philanthropy.
The crucial difference between for-profit social entrepreneurship and
nonprofit philanthropy is that only those in control of charitable
organizations have the privilege and responsibility of subordinating all
interests to the charitable mission of the organization. For charities, all
private goals are subordinated to mission and there can be no compromise
between the private interests and the public interests that the charity serves.
102
The non-distribution constraint that characterizes nonprofit organizations
is the consequence of the adherence to mission, not vice versa. The
constraint guarantees that the organization will be operated to achieve its
mission, and never for the benefit of shareholders or other private interests.
As soon as profits can be paid out to individuals, the role of directors
becomes unclear and conflicted. No board can simultaneously treat its
charitable mission and its shareholders' private pecuniary interests as
paramount.
At some point, those interests are likely to become
incompatible, and the law must be clear about whether directors must
sacrifice ideals for profits, or vice versa. Separating nonprofit and for-profit
organizations is necessary to preserve these legal standards, and to give any
fiduciary obligations content. 103 With the rise of for-profit philanthropy,
increasing the resemblance of nonprofit governance to for-profit
governance is a mistake because it fosters a type of accountability that is
more suited to serving the private goal of profit than the public goal of
mission.
IV.

CREATING A CONTEMPORARY NORM OF
FIDELITY TO CHARITABLE MISSION

In Part II, I described the duty of obedience as the stepchild fiduciary
obligation, and consistent with that role, it has not been well enforced. The
cases that discuss it generally rely on other causes of action as well. Under

102. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (requiring for exemption that "no part of the net
earnings... inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual"). See generally

Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (1996).
103. In the business context, the constituency statutes adopted by some states to allow
directors to consider non-shareholder interests have been criticized for watering down the
fiduciary obligations of shareholders. If a board may consider anyone's interests, it is more
likely to be accountable to nobody. See generally James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire:
NonshareholderConstituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 97 (1991); Mark E.
Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 27
(1996).
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standing rules, individual donors are virtually foreclosed from bringing
lawsuits based on the duty of obedience, 10 4 leaving it to state attorneys
general to define and enforce it. Attorneys general, however, are not
clamoring to take on that role. 105
Information about enforcement
proceedings is not easy to acquire and there is little public disclosure of
settlements. 10 6 Under the current legal regime, it is "nearly impossible to
hold a charitable fiduciary liable for breach of [any] duty except in the most
10 7
egregious circumstances, often only if criminal behavior were involved."'
Only financial impropriety leads to significant enforcement efforts by
attorneys general, whether framed in terms of care, loyalty, or obedience
violations.' 0 8 Nonfinancial problems may not be considered sufficient for
devoting government enforcement resources. 10 9 In this part, I defend an
enforceable duty of obedience, explain how it would apply, and consider
ways that it might be enforced.
Some may be wary of an enforceable duty of obedience because it can
give regulators too much power as arbiters of effectiveness for nonprofit
organizations; attorneys general sometimes define the public interest in
surprising ways. I 10 Measuring effectiveness may be the most intractable
problem that charities have: Because their goals rarely translate into
measurable returns, and are often long-term, there may be no way to
measure success in a timely way, or at all. Shorthand measures commonly
used, such as percentage of revenue used for overhead, are not necessarily
useful because lack of overhead may coincide with lack of program
evaluation or careful design. Without profits as a measure, it is virtually
impossible to determine effectiveness for many kinds of charitable
organizations. Going forward, nonprofits will increasingly need to establish
metrics that will allow them to gauge their success.
104. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 466-67
(1996).

105. As the Supreme Court of California noted,
The Attorney General may not be in a position to become aware of wrongful
conduct or to be sufficiently familiar with the situation to appreciate its impact,
and the various responsibilities of his office may ... make it burdensome for him
to institute legal actions except in situations of serious public detriment.
Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1964).

106. Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors
of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 25, 25, 31

(2003) (finding five cases reported in the media from 1995 through 2002 in which officers
were accused of failing to carry out their organization's charitable missions).
107. Fremont-Smith, supra note 11, at 53.
108. For an excellent discussion of mission accountability connected with asset
protection, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 8. Once a financial impropriety is identified and
enforcement is undertaken, a court may find violations of more than one duty. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40, 42 (App. Div. 2007); Att'y Gen. v.
Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1017-18 (Mass. 1986).
109. See Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in The State of Nonprofit
America 471, 479 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).

110. See Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 54 (describing the dubious actions of the state
in the dispute over the investment policies of the Hershey Trust).
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Whether there exists a legally enforceable duty of obedience to mission is
largely about the appropriate limits of law and legal rules. The law can no
more enforce success on charities than it can enforce profits on businesses.
The law needs to develop an understanding of the obligation that requires
that nonprofit directors and managers are engaged in the pursuit of the kind
of public benefits that justify the pedestal on which charities stand in the
community. This is why I prefer to think of the obligation as fidelity to
mission, rather than obedience.
Fidelity lacks the oppressiveness,
inflexibility, and control over policy by long-dead founders that obedience
implies, and captures the loftiness of the responsibility. A contemporary
conception of the obligation can empower boards without freeing them
completely from legal constraint.
A. What Would FidelityDo?
The nature of obedience that needs reinforcement in the law is closely
connected to the overarching theme of this conference-the economic
challenges facing charities today, because economic challenges are most
likely to threaten boards' full commitment to mission by distracting their
attention from charitable goals toward resource accumulation. Nonprofit
boards today must spend tremendous time and energy building endowment
or raising a capital fund. The conception of obedience as fidelity allows
boards the substantial discretion that would allow directors to exercise
judgment about the direction of an organization. But, it would stop at the
limits of a reasonable interpretation of charitable mission.
As an example, consider again the MEETH case, discussed above. 1 1 If
the obedience failure in MEETH was changing the method for delivering
particular health-care services, as the court suggests, the concept is too
restrictive. Alternatively, obedience as fidelity would support directors in
their decision of how best to carry out the health-care mission of the
organization. If the hospital's certificate was too narrow to allow the
resources to be used for another medical purpose, fidelity to mission would
not prevent the board from amending its organizational documents to allow
the assets to be so used. 112 The obedience problem arises otherwise in the
MEETH case, and can be understood along the lines described here because
it was a case in which the board allowed the hospital's high real estate value
to blind it to its health-care mission's primacy. The directors violated their
duty of obedience as fidelity to charitable mission because they allowed the
prospect of money to distract them from their charitable goals. If the
MEETH board sacrificed mission for money, as directors may often be
tempted to do when they are sitting on valuable real estate or intellectual
property, their duty of fidelity should require that they subordinate those
111. See supra notes 41-43, 71-77 and accompanying text.
112. This excludes restricted assets, which must be used according to the terms of their
contracts. See N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law §§ 801-802 (McKinney 2004) (empowering

directors to amend certificates of incorporation).
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economic interests. There is nothing in the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty that would explicitly require them to make that choice.
Obedience as fidelity should be understood as a bolster to the best
judgment rule, rather than as a limitation on it, because it comfortably
coexists with extensive powers for boards to modify an organization's
purposes. While it is possible to argue that empowering directors to change
purposes undermines the notion of obedience, I believe that it frees
obedience from the narrow purposes stated in the documents and instead
connects it to the broader charitable purposes motivating the institution.
This is how care and obedience come together-the board must exercise
care in evaluating the charitable goals and effectiveness of the organization.
If the purpose clause in the organizational documents fails to address
current charitable needs, the board should be allowed to change it. While a
court might review the care with which the board reached the decision, and
the attorney general may have a participatory role in the process, it is
appropriate for judicial review to be highly deferential to the reasoned
decisions of charity boards.
Obedience as fidelity empowers boards to exercise their judgment in the
name of mission by allowing them to depart from business law constraints.
For example, a decision to forego revenue by offering free or low-cost
services where the market might tolerate a higher price would be justifiable,
as would be a decision to forego maximum exploitation of assets, or to
rebuff a lucrative offer for the sale of real estate or operations. While a
waste claim can always be made against a for-profit board, even if it has
satisfied care and loyalty, obedience should be a defense to such a claim for
a charity that can show its decision carried out charitable goals.
As an example of obedience filling the void left by care and loyalty, too
much attention to endowment building may present a violation of directors'
duty of fidelity, though endowment building is clearly consistent with care
and loyalty. In a recent letter from Senators Max Baucus and Chuck
Grassley to Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr., the senators
inquired about the federal "commensurate in scope" doctrine, and requested
guidance from the Treasury that "will put more teeth into the commensurate
test."1 13 That tax law doctrine is under defined under current law,' 14 but the
senators' understanding of it as "charities need[ing] to provide charitable
work commensurate with their resources" reflects the impetus behind an
obligation of fidelity to charitable goals. 115 More specifically, the duty of

113. Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin., & Sen. Max Baucus,
Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin., to Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y of the Treasury (May
at
2007),
available
29,
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/press/Bpress/2007press/prbO52907.pdf.

114. See Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186, which introduced the requirement, without
explaining what commensurate in scope means.
115. A current payout requirement for public charities might be one mechanism by which
the Internal Revenue Service can partially enforce what I am advocating as a state-law
fiduciary obligation.
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obedience might limit the power of donors to make restrictions on gifts that
divert the attention of an organization's board and managers from the
charitable goals of the organization to wealth accumulation. The press has
recently reported on T. Boone Pickens's gift of $50 million to two Texas
institutions. The gifts came with the requirement that those institutions
make the $50 million grow to $500 million within twenty-five years or lose
the money at that time.' 16 While the restrictions may be legal under current
1 17
law, the gift does not seem like a great deal to the recipient charities.
Nevertheless, it is hard to turn down $50 million, even when it has strings
attached.
The duty of fidelity, by legally obligating boards to pursue charitable
goals, should serve to limit the level of micromanaging that donors can
achieve by using restricted gifts. It must be the clear duty and privilege of
the board to determine the course that an organization will take. While a
fiduciary obligation that strengthens boards vis-A-vis donors might
discourage some gifts, some gifts might not be worth their costs. An
invigorated duty of fidelity could empower charities to resist these types of
gifts and could also discourage donors from attaching such cumbersome
restrictions on their gifts. 18
B. Is Fidelity Enforceable?
Legal rules imply enforceability, so the difficulty of enforcement may be
an argument against codification as a legal rule. But legal rules also imply
norms and expectations at a more persuasive level than model codes of
conduct, so it is important that fidelity have the status of a legal rule. I am
not advocating a liability-creating rule, but fidelity could nonetheless be
effectively enforced directly or indirectly. Nonprofit enforcement has
embraced various remedies that are more promising and constructive than
monetary liability for breaches of duty. 1 9 Only where a fiduciary has
profited at the organization's expense does a monetary remedy seem to
address the wrongdoing. 120
116. Debra Blum, Oil Tycoon Gives $100-Million-With Strings Attached, Chron. of
Philanthropy, May 16, 2007, http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2007/05/2007051601.htrn.
117. See
Charity
Governance,
http://www.charitygovernance.com/charity-.govemance/2007/05/t-boone-pickens.html#more
(May 21, 2007, 17:04).
118. To the extent these gift restrictions burden charitable goals, the tax law rules on
deductibility could also help to discourage them in favor of unrestricted gifts by delaying the
deduction until the restrictions lift, or by subjecting restricted donations to lower percentage
limitations under I.R.C. § 170(b) (2000). Under current law, a gift with too many conditions
may not constitute a current gift at all; payment is required. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
119. See Brody, supra note 2.
120. Monetary liability seems less suitable for nonprofit breaches of duty than for
breaches by business boards because of the economic structure of charities compared to
business corporations. The monetary remedy in business corporations may help ameliorate
the "other people's money" problem that characterizes the public business corporation. That
problem is less severe in charities that rely on donations because board members are
generally big donors to the organization, so their lapses in judgment are often misuses of
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Laws can be flexible without being arbitrary and enforcement can be
tailored to achieve results. Removal of directors may be an effective
remedy. 12 1 The Sibley Hospital court required that all directors read the
court's opinion as an education mechanism. 122 In the Getty Trust
investigation, the California attorney general has maintained oversight of
the foundation as part of its resolution of the matter.12 3 While I am not
endorsing any particular remedy, and I am troubled by the possibility of
parochialism in enforcement, 124 diverse and creative remedies are a
promising development because they suggest that regulators are working to
design solutions that will improve the operation of organizations and
preserve assets in the charitable sector. For financial wrongdoing, requiring
that the wrongdoer make the organization whole seems a reasonable
remedy, but for fidelity problems, a legal remedy that sets the organization
back on course should be uniquely responsive.
One commentator has suggested that the duty of obedience can be
enforced "through the development of internal norms that facilitate a culture
of trust" between the board and the organization's managers. 125 Her
solution is a reorganization of the nonprofit board to include more manageremployees on the board and reduce the size of the board so that those
manager-employees are a powerful bloc. While trust in the boardroom is
certainly important to the smooth functioning of an institution, the duty of
obedience as fidelity must be an external norm, as well as an internal one.
Obedience deserves status as a legal norm with a legal solution because it is
the public interest that fidelity ultimately protects; it needs a public
representative such as the Attorney General or the IRS. It must be enforced
from outside an organization and with regard to the public benefits that an
organization has a responsibility to serve. Fidelity must protect against the
capture of charitable organizations by any private interest-whether those
interests are the private interest of donors, managers, or individual board
members. In nonprofit organizations, there is as much danger from a board
too dependent on the judgment of the executive director as there is from one
too conflicted with him.
The closest we come to enforcing a fidelity requirement is the federal tax
law, since the state attorneys general do not seem to enforce obedience
without connection to other breaches of fiduciary duty or financial
impropriety. Eligibility for exemption requires that organizations be both
their own contributed funds. Whereas monetary sanctions might encourage business boards
to act as if they were managing their own-rather than the shareholders'-money,
significant contributors are more likely to perceive themselves as spending their own gifts.
121. See In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048 (Haw. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1999), available
at http://starbulletin.com/999/O5/O7/news/removal.html.

122. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries
(Sibley Hospital), 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1019 (D.D.C. 1974).
123. See Bill Lockyer, Report on the Office of the Attorney General's Investigation of the
J. Paul Getty Trust (2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-085-0a.pdf.
124. See Brody, Whose Public?,supra note 54.
125. Sasso, supra note 10, at 1545.
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organized and operated for enumerated charitable purposes.
These
requirements have been interpreted to cover the documentation and practice
of organizations, and a very broad notion of obedience as fidelity to any
charitable purpose, could be enforced in that way. "Since the duty of
obedience requires the directors to uphold the organization's founding
documents, which require the organization to operate for a charitable
purpose, operating for non-exempt purposes would be an ultra vires
activity."' 126 The question is whether there is any more narrow limitation
appropriate in understanding the contours of fidelity.
The unrelated business income tax (UBIT) encourages directors and
managers to connect revenue generation to their charitable missions. By
taxing revenue arising from non-mission-related activities, those activities
become more expensive and, consequently, less attractive.1 2 7 Managers can
invest the organization's money without tax liability in passive investments,
which presumably require less of their attention than do active businesses.
Perhaps the UBIT has worked splendidly in this regard since surprisingly
few organizations seem to have unrelated businesses. 128 The recently
adopted requirement that organizations disclose their UBIT returns 129 may
be an additional incentive to organizations to avoid unrelated businesses.
Disclosure is a good enforcement mechanism when incentivizing desirable
behavior is sufficient to carry out the underlying policies. The UBIT taxes
certain activities, without prohibiting them, but the incentive that it creates
may go a long way toward forcing managers to keep their eyes on the status
of their charitable goals. Federalization of obedience in the UBIT rules is
consistent with the duty's status as the stepsister of care and loyalty. Just as
care and loyalty are directly enforced under state law, their violation, as
interpreted in the tax law through the rules barring inurement and private
benefit, are grounds for revocation of exemption. The UBIT, on the other
hand, has a greater parallel to aspirational standards in state fiduciary duty
law because it gives charities incentives to hew closely to their missions,
but does not punish them too harshly if they veer away. They may be
taxed, but their exemption is not at risk.
Additional disclosure requirements may be the most effective mechanism
for enforcing obedience as fidelity. Under the federal securities laws,
disclosure is the cornerstone of public company regulation, and there is a
well-developed industry that makes determinations about companies based
126. James J. Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 239

n.148 (2003).
127. See John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and CharitableTax Exemption, 44 Win.
& Mary L. Rev. 487,493-94 (2002).
128. The percentage of nonprofit organizations filing unrelated business income tax

(UBIT) returns has decreased in recent years. In 1990, twenty-two percent of organizations
that filed Form 990 with the Internal Revenue Service also filed a UBIT return; in 2002, that
percentage dropped to fourteen percent. IRS, Nonprofit Charitable Organization & Domestic
Private Foundation Information Returns and Exempt Organization Business Income Returns:
Selected Financial Data, 1985-2002 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histabl6e.xls.
129. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1225, I.R.C. § 6104(d)(l)(A)(ii) (West 2007).
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on their public disclosures. A mandate to companies to disclose audited
and certified financial statements 130 assumes that stakeholders can get
reliable, material information from those disclosures that might affect their
decision about investing in a company. 13 1 While various stakeholders
might be concerned about the uses of funds in a nonprofit organization,
financial statements are unlikely to give the most meaningful information
about whether an organization is achieving its mission.
Donors,
beneficiaries, and members of the general public all care about whether the
organization adequately serves the needs of the community that it is
designed to serve. As a tool, IRS Form 990 is more informative than the
financial statements of an organization. The Form 990 has long required
not only detailed information about the organization's investments and
expenses, but also about the relationship of activities to accomplishment of
exempt purpose. 132
It allows a potential donor to see how the
organization's expenses are divided between program services,
management in general, and fund-raising.' 33 In its recent redesign, 134
which is scheduled to become effective for 2008, the Form 990 demands
more specific and tailored financial information about organizations. To
the IRS's credit, the revised form does not simply adopt the corporate
model of financial statements. For example, the new Form 990 will include
more specific information about activities in which an organization
engages, including political activities, activities outside the United States,
and a special new schedule for hospitals that provides information about
services performed and community benefits.
The Form 990 is a promising mechanism for increasing mission
accountability of nonprofits. While Form 990s are required by law to be
publicly available 135 and are readily available on the Internet, 13 6 most
people are unaware that they can easily locate and understand them. I
would support a requirement that charities provide links to their Form 990s
on their own web sites as a way to improve accountability generally and
encourage greater adherence to mission specifically. Members of the public
interested in donating, patronizing, or otherwise interacting with the
organization are very likely to visit its web site, but quite unlikely to come
130. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004)).
131. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (adopting the materiality test
from TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), to apply to the sale of

securities). "[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. (quoting TSC
Industries,426 U.S. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

132. See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No.
1545-0047) pt. VIII (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.

133. Id. pt. II.
134. I.R.S. News
Release, IR-2007-117 (Jun.
14, 2007), available
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id= 171329,00.html (linking to revisions).
135. I.R.C. § 6104 (2000).

at

136. See GuideStar, http://www.guidestar.org/npo/nplinks/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 23,
2007).
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across the Form 990 otherwise. That the Form 990 is different from the
disclosure required by business organizations is important, even though its
primary function, like Securities and Exchange Commission filings for
137
public corporations, is the disclosure of information.
Other disclosure requirements might serve to create incentives to achieve
charitable goals as well. Disclosure is a more meaningful disciplinary tool
in the era of the Internet and is a relatively cheap requirement to impose on
organizations, particularly where they are required to disclose information
they are already obligated to prepare. In addition to the Form 990
disclosure, states could require web site disclosure of charities' selfassessment of their operations. While this might be somewhat costly to
prepare, it would serve to ensure that boards reflect on their goals and
progress, which would serve obedience, but also care. It would add some
teeth to the best practices conduct standards that do not currently have the
force of law.
Finally, the press has long played an important role in nonprofit
enforcement, but that role has not been institutionalized in the law. Press
scrutiny of nonprofit organizations and the repercussions that charities
suffer from bad press may help enforce fidelity, as a practical matter, and
future attention to the role of the press in the legal enforcement of fiduciary
duties may be worthwhile. Regulators tend to follow up on abuses
identified by the news media, 13 8 and the public responds to information
about misdeeds. 139 Public confidence in charities has declined since
Hurricane Katrina. 140 The considerable power of the press may imply an
important function for journalists in enforcing the fidelity obligation of
nonprofit organizations.
In sum, it seems foolhardy to try to develop a more enforceable and
justiciable duty of obedience to be carried out by the courts. Attorneys
137. This differs from many tax forms, which have a primary function of payment of
taxes.
138. Investigation of the Getty Trust was started on account of articles published in the
Los Angeles Times. See Lockyer, supra note 123.
139. While there is limited information, the anecdotal evidence clearly suggests that the
market for donations responds to public knowledge of wrongdoing.
Several articles
indicated that the post-9/l 1 Red Cross publicity had repercussions for the national charitable
sector. See Donald A. Moore, RestoringFaith in CharitiesMeans Giving a Voice to Donors,
Chron. of Philanthropy, Nov. 29, 2001, at 37. The extremely high visibility of the cause led
to general public suspicion about the use of charitable funds and calls for additional scrutiny
that have not gone away. See Stephanie Strom, Faith in CharitiesStill Below Pre-9/11 Level,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2003, at A28.
140. Professor Paul C. Light has completed an empirical study on public perceptions of
charitable giving in which he found that more than forty percent of the American public has
"no confidence or not much confidence" in U.S. charities, compared with about thirty-three
percent who said they lacked such trust before Hurricane Katrina. See Jacqueline L. Salmon,
Red Cross, Humane Society Under Investigation, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 2006, at A10. The
press prominence of the child sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic Church had a severe
negative impact on donations; in a recent study, one in nine regular churchgoers indicated
that the crisis had led them to reduce their giving. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Abuse Scandal Is
DeterringCatholicDonors, Poll Says, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2002, at A14.
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general charged with charity governance have insufficient resources to
handle the range of regulation they currently oversee. While the IRS is
increasingly in the business of charity governance,' 4 it has limited
resources for enforcement as well. We need to design incentives that will
bolster the enforcement of an obligation of obedience, so that attention to
the underlying goals of an organization do not fall by the wayside as
nonprofits improve their financial reporting and increasingly model their
governance structures on their business counterparts.
CONCLUSION

The law of nonprofit governance is undergoing an exciting
transformation, and has wisely borrowed from the law of for-profit
corporate governance. While nonprofit organizations resemble their forprofit counterparts in many ways, they differ in important respects that the
law must recognize.
The public nature of nonprofit organizations
fundamentally distinguishes them from their business counterparts, and
regulatory mechanisms must substitute for the market incentives that
control business behavior. This essay has argued for a reinvigorated and
redefined duty of obedience for nonprofit directors, which I have called
"fidelity." "Obedience" is problematic because it has been interpreted too
rigidly, but the law needs something to take its place because the corporate
obligations of care, loyalty, and good faith are insufficient for nonprofit
directors.
The obligation of fidelity creates a legal norm requiring
adherence to charitable goals, while allowing directors considerable
flexibility and discretion. Fidelity distinguishes nonprofit directors from
business directors, signaling the importance of charitable mission for
nonprofit organizations and requiring subordination of all other substantive
goals.

141. See IRS, Good Governance Practices for 501(c)(3) Organizations, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/good-governance-practices.pdf.
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